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PARTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
(Concluded)

The principle adopted by the Supreme Court of he
United States is not universally adopted by courts. The
state of Kansas after defining a trust as a combination
to effect any of five kinds of results, prescribes penalties
for the making of a trust. Smiley was found guilty and
sentenced to be fined and imprisoned. He appealed from
the state court to the Supreme Court, alleging that some
of the prohibitions of the act violated the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, in unduly infringing the freedom of contract, and transcending the police power of
the state. The particular combination of which the
defendant was accused and found guilty, was not of this
sort, but, alone, might, constitutionally have been penalized. The State Court refused to say that that part of
the act under which the conviction took place, was unconstitutional because oth4rs were. - In the Supreme
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Court of the United States, Justice Brewer remarks: "Nor
is it material that the state court ascertains the meaning and scope of the statute as well as its validity, by purauing a different rule of construction from that we recognize. It may be that the views of the Kansas court
in respect to this matter are not in harmony with those
expressed by us in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214
(and others). We shall not stop to consider that question nor the reconciliation of the supposed conflicting
views suggested by the chief justice of the state. The
power to determine the meaning ,of a statute carries with
it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as
well as the method by which they shall be determined."'
The Act of Aug. 18th, 1894, provides that "In every
case where an -alien is excluded from admission into the
United States under any law or treaty now existing or
hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of
such alien, shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury." The Act of Feb. 14th, 1903,
transfers this power of entertaining appeals, to the Department of Commerce and Labor. It was contended
that the provision for the finality of the decision should
be deemed valid, only in cases in which the person whose
admission is in question is in fact an alien. Justice
Holmes replies2 the act being a "single section, accomplishing all its results by the same general words, must
be valid as to all that it embraces, or altogether void.
An exception of a class constitutionally exempted cannot
be read into those general words merely for the purpose
of saving what remains. That has been decided over
Apparently he means that if there
and over again."
'Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447.
'UniteO States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253.
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were any class embraced by the general words, to which
could not be constitutionally extended the provision for
the conclusiveness of the decision of the Department of
Oommerce and Labor, the act would be void even as to
such persons as could, if alone, have been made to be
affected by it. The relevancy of the observation of the
justice is not very apparent. The question was, whether
the decision by the Department that a citizen, i. e. one
born in the United States, was not a citizen but an alien,
and therefore not entitled to admission into the country,
was conclusive. The act speaks of "every case where an
alien is excluded."
The constitution of Missouri' provided that the legislature should not authorize any city or town to become
a stockholder in or loan its credit to any corporation "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters" should, at an
election, express their consent thereto. The legislature
authorized the city of Louisiana to subscribe for stock
in any railroad company connecting with the city by submitting an ordinance providing for it, to a vote of the
resident tax-payers, a majority of whom should authorize it. An election of the qualified voters-not of the
tax-payers-was held.
Of 356 qualified voters, 336
voted for the subscription to stock, and 10 against it. The
subscription was made and bonds issued. The city refusing to pay the coupons, suit was brought against it.
Was the gift of power by the legislature, conditioned on
the consent of a majority of the tax-payers, valid? It was
held not.
The legislature adopted a condition, compliance with which would not necessarily be compliance
with the constitutional condition. The courts will not
delete from the act this condition, nor insert in the act,
the condition presented by the constitution. If parts
llen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80.
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of a statute, says Chief Justice Waite, are so independent
of each other, that it may be assumed that the legislature would have enacted one without the other, the unconstitutionality of one part, will not avoid the other.
"The point to be determined in all such cases is whether
the unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the
general scope of the law, as to make it impossible to give
effect to what appears to have been the intent of the
legislature, if those provisions are stricken out."
An interesting illustration of the principle under
consideration, is presented by chapter 3073 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. This chapter enacted that every common carrier engaged in commerce between the several states shall be ,liable -toany of its employees for all damages resulting from the negligence
of any of its employees. An interstate common carrier
may also carry goods from point to point in the same
state. It may have employees who are engaged wholly
in its intra-state business. In so far as its business is
intra-state, it is beyond the power of Congress. But
the Act of Congress does not in imposing liability, limit
it to cases arising in inter-state business, or to employees
so engaged. It was held void, therefore even as to injuries occasioned to employees engaged in interstate
ccmmerce, by employees engaged, at the .time of the accident, in the same commerce. The fact that congress
might constitutionally have legislated for accidents in
interstate commerce, did not justify the court's holding
the act valid, in application to interstate business, altogether invalid, as applied to intra-state business. Chief
Justice White refused to find in the act, indications that
Congress intended it to apply only to interstate business,
and he declined to distinguish between the classes of
cases. to which its language was applicable, and to hold
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it valid as to one, viz, interstate transaetions, and invalid
as to the other.'
Another decision has been made, upon the same
sttue. It reads "That every common carrier engaged
-n uraue or commerce in the District of Columbia, or in
any territory of the United States, or between the sevcrai btates, or between any territory and another, or between any territory or territories -andany state or states,
ur tue District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or
Leuween the District of Columbia and any state or states
ur ioreign nations, shall be liable to any of its employees,
or in the case of his death, to his personal representative
* * ior all damages that may result from the negligence of any of its officers, agents or employees, or by
reason oi any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed, ways or works." Gutierrez, when in the service of a railroad in the territory of New. Mexico, was
killed, as a result of the negligence of an agent or employee of the railroad. New Aexico had created a liability for death from wrongful act, but had conditioned
the right to recover on the service on the defendant
within 90 days after the infliction of -the injury, and 30
days before commencing suit, of an affidavit covering
certain particulars of the accident, and giving the names
of witnesses.
The administratrix of the deceased
brought an action in Texas, for his death. She had not
given the affidavit. If the New Mexican law governed
the case, this omission was fatal to the right to recover.
But, the act of Congress supra, was enacted eleven days
before the accident, and if it was constitutional, it superseded the territorial law, and the failure to give the afHIowarld v. Illinois C. R. Co., 201 U. S. 463. See the diuenting opinion of Juistic* Moody, p. 510.
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fidavit was innocuous.
As respeots negligences in
states, this act had been declared unconstitutional in
Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463. Did its invalidity as to injuries happening in the states, make it
invalid as to those happening in territories? The power
of Congress over all matters, is plenary in the territories. In the states it is limited to defined subjects. Justice Day holds that the legislation as to territories, and
that as to states, might have been in separate acts. The
right to regulate one class of liability in nowise depends upon the other. If the court is unable to say what
Congress would have done, if it had omitted the unconstitutional feature, the entire statute must be held void,
because of the unconstitutionality of a part. The Justice courageously states that he thinks it apparent that
had Congress not proposed to deal with injuries arising
in states, "it would have dealt with the subject (of injuries in the territories and District) and enacted the
curative provisions of the law applicable to the District
of Columbia and the territories." Admirable clairvoyance! He then asks us to bear in mind "the reluctance
with which this court interferes with the action of a
co-ordinate branch of the government, and its duty, no
less than its disposition to sustain the enactments of the
national legislature," a reluctance which has only an intermittent visibility. The result is, that the act of Congress is as to the territories valid; hence it has virtually
abrogated the act of the territorial legislature, and hence,
the plaintiff may recover, although she has not given the
exacted affidavit.
The constitution of Oklahoma which had virtually
given the franchise to all male citizens 21 years of age,
was in 1910 amended so as to provide that no person
should be registered as a voter or allowed to vote "unless
he be able to read and write any section" of the state

Dickinson Law Review
constitution. It was added that no person should be
deprived of 'the right of registration and voting because
of illiteracy "who was, on January 1st, 1866, or any
time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of
government, or who at that time resided in some foreign
nation, and no lineal descendant of such person." Election officers were prosecuted under a statute of the
United States, for refusing to allow certain negroes to
vote, who could not read the constitution. Chief Justice
White decided that the clause concerning being entitled
to vote was unconstitutional, ag violating the 15th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Did the invalidity of that clause, render the clause concerning illiteracy also invalid-? The latter clause, if alone,
would be constitutional; that is, states may require capacity to read, as a condition of voting. Whether the
voidness of the 1866 clause, involves that of the reading
clause, is really a question of state law, says C. J. White,
but in the absence of Oklahoma authority, he must decide it himself. He accordingly decides it as is his wont
in a mass of sentences well nigh unintelligible, that the
literary clause is also inoperative. It was the intent of
the Constitution, that the classes whose voting is provided for in the 1866 clause should not be excluded, because
of illiteracy, an intent that would be defeated if all voters
and therefore negroes, were required to be able to read.'
In a civil action against election officers of the state of
Maryland, a similar question was considered by the same
Justice,' with the same result.
In Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co.?" a decision
the
Railroad Commission of Kentucky, fixing the rates
of

'Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347.
WMyers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368.
'231 U. S. 298.
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which a railroad might charge for transportation, was
questioned under a bill to enjoin the execution of an order of the Commission. For charging in excess of the
rates fixed by the commission, the act of Kentucky,
which established the commission, imposed certain penalties. The penalty provisions were challenged, as well
as the action of the commission in establishing the rates.
Without deciding whether these penalties were unconstitutional, Justice Hughes sustains the dismissal of the
bill by the remark "But, as already stated, these provisions are separable." A similar question -appears in Grand
Trunk Railway Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission,'
Justice McKenna remarking, "It is contended by appellants that the statute is void upon its face because the
severity of the penalties preclude (sic) an appeal to the
courts against its provisions except at such risks and
costs that they should not be compelled to incur * * * .
But the provision for penalties is in a section by itself,
and when their enforcement is attempted, their constitutionality can then (sic) be determined."'
Alabama imposed a state tax on "each person, firm
or corporation selling or delivering sewing machines
either in person or through agents" of $50 annually for
each county in which they may sell or deliver said articles. The Singer Sewing Machine Co. had in each county of the state, except Russell, a store where its machines were kept. Agents operating in the respective
counties delivered machines, on ptirchase or loan. Machines were then furnished to Russell county from a
house in the State of Georgia. Since the law did not distinguish between Russell and the other counties, and
'231 U. S. 457.
'Of. Southern PAcific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537, and cases
there cited. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Richmond,
224 U. S. 160; Southiwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114.
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since, as was argued, the tax was invalid as to Russell
county as being on interstate commerce, it was contended
that the law even in so far as it imposed a tax on business in the other counties, although the commerce therein was intra-state commerce, was unconstitutional. Justice Pitney, after referring to United States v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214, and other cases, remarks "The statute now
under consideration differs materially, in that it deals
separately with the business as conducted in each coun.ty -of the state, and provides for separate taxes to be
laid for each county. And the facts as averred in the
bill of complaint show that with respect to all of the
counties in which appellant does business, excepting only
the county of Russell, there is no element of interstate
commerce. * * * It would be going altogether too far to
say that appellant being properly taxable, and without
the least "interference with interstate commerce, in
29 counties. of the state, could obtain immunity from
all such taxation by establishing in one county a system
that involved transactions in interstate coinof business
merce. ,"
InHarrison v. St. Louis, etc. Railroad Co.," reference
the
syllabus is made to the principle that the invalidity
in
of one part of a statute may involve that of another, but
the case did not require the application of the principle
nor is there in the discussion of Chief Justice White any
distinct reference to it.
A Michigan statute of 1889 made it unlawful to make
or sell liquors in any county where a majority of voters
voted in favor of prohibition. Acts of 1899 and 1903
provided that that of 1889 should not be construed to
"Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Bricknell, 23a U. S.304.
"282 U1. S. 318.
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prohibit the sale of wine or cider made from home-grown
fruit, etc. In 1909 the electors of Jackson county voted
in favor of prohibition. Certain persons being convicted
for making beer, the supreme court of the state held that
the amendments -to the law of 1899 and 1903, were void
as discriminating against the products of other states,
but that the act of 1889 was constitutional. Justice
Lamar agrees with it, notwithstanding that some voters
of Jackson county may have voted for prohibition under
the belief that the amendments of 1899 and 1903 were
valid.'
A telegraph company does both interstate and intrastate business; business for the United States, and for
others. If -a state statute, or a municipal ordinance,
passed in pursuance of a state statute, requires it to pay
a tax for the doing of its business generally; and not
for the doing of its intra-state business only, the tax
is void. There is no way of determining how much of
the tax is on account of the national and inter-state business, and how much for the intra-state business.'
The ordinance may constitutionally distinguish between the two kinds of business, and impose a license
tax on the latter kind.' A state railroad commission may
regulate the charges for intra-state transportation by
railroads engaged in both inter-state and intra-state
transportation.'
Section 5507 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States enacts that "Every person who prevents, hinders,
controls or intimidates another from exercising or in ex"Eberle v. Mdhigan, 232 U. S. 700.
"Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S.404. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460.
"Postal Telegraph Co. v. Chhrleston, 153 U. S. 602.
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537.
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ercising the right of suffrage to whom that right is guaranteed by the 15th Amendment * * * by means of bribing
or threats of depriving such person of employment or
occupation, or of ejecting such person from a rented
house, lands or other property, or by threats of refusing to renew leases or contracts of labor or by threats of
violence to himself or family, shall be punished as provided in the preceding section."
The 15th amendment
enacts that the right of citizens to vote shall not be dei ied or abridged by the United States or by any state,
on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and confers on Congress power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. At an election of a representative to Congress, in Kentucky, certain negroes
were by bribery, intimidated and prevented from voting,
by Bowman. He being arrested, sued out a habeas corpus,
alleging the act of Congress unconstitutional. Brewer,
J., approving his discharge by the District Court, held
that the 15th amendment did not authorize Congress to
punish acts of intimidation, etc., by individuals at state
elections. The act of Congress does not distinguish between federal and state elections. It is wholly void therefore, void not only as to election of state officers, but
as to elections of federal officers. Congress not having made the distinction, the courts will not. Sagely observes Justice Brewer, "Doubtless even acriminal statute
may be good in part and bad in part providing (sic) the
two can be clearly separated, and it is apparent that
the legislative body would have enacted the one without
the other, but, there are no two parts in this statute."
If Congress had sectioned its statute, if it had said (a)
Every person who prevents, etc. in a state election; (b)
and every person who prevents, etc., in a federal election,
any person from casting his vote, etc., (a) might be held
void and rejected without impairing (b) but since no
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distinction was expressed in the statute, though congress,
the courts, everybody knew that there were two sort&
of elections and that Congress was virtually saying, in
all elections, whether federal or state, one who prevents
a voter, etc., the inclusion of state elections vitiates the
act even as to federal elections.
The act of March 1st, 1875, enacted that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations * * * of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, etc., and that "any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons 'by law applicable to citizens of every
race and color, and regardless of any previous condition
of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, * * * enumerated, * * * shall for every such
offence forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person
agrieved thereby * * * and shall also *'* * be deemed
o.uilty of a misdemeanor," etc. A colored -woman was
denied eoual accommodations in a steamer plying between
Baltimore and Boston, while it was on the high seas. Conzress could have constitutionally legislated for such- a
case, but its legislation did not distinguish between denials of accommodations. etc., in interstate or international commerce, and denials within states.
Because
legislation by Congress for the latter class of denials
was beyond its power, the entire act was void, and the
plaintiff, suing for the $500 was not allowed to recover.
.tIstice Van Devanter observes, after quoting from United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, "So here to give to the
sections in question the effedt suggested, it- would be
necessary td reject or strike out the general words "within the jurisdiction of the United States" whereby Congress intended to declare and define in what places the
sections should be operative and to insert other and new
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words, restricting their operations to American vessels
upon the high seas and to the District
the territories. To do this would be to
tation where Congress intended none,
make a new penal statute, which, of
not do. '

of Columbia and
introduce a limiand thereby to
course, we may

Missouri passed an act, prescribing certain maximum rates for the carriage by railroads of freight and
passengers. Certain railroads filed bills to enjoin the enforcement of those rates on the ground that they Were
confiscatory. They were found not to be so, as to some,
while confiscatory as to other railroads. Justice Hughes
refused to yield to the argument that if the rates were
invalid as to some roads, they were invalid as to all. The
acts are valid upon their face as a proper exercise of
governmental authority in the establishment of reasonable rates, and each complaint, in order to succeed in assailing them, must show that as to it, the rates are confiscatory."'"
A state statute imposed liabilities on railroads for
negligence with respect to cars, roadbed, machinery, and
also for the negligence of a co-employe, at a time when,
with regard to railroads engaged in interstate business,
Congress had legislated with regard to the former sorts
of negligence, but not with regard to the negligence of a
co-employe. The resulting invalidity of so much of the
state statute as pertained to cars, roadbed, machinery,
etc., of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, did
riot impair that part of the act which respected the negligence of a co-employe."'
"Butts v. Merchants', etc. Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126.
Cnott v. Railroad Commissioners, 230 U. -S. 474.
'Missouri R. R. Co. v. Cattle, 224 U. S. 541.
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An act of Congress authorized a suit before the
Court of Claims, and thence an appeal to the Supreme
Court, for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of certain legislation affecting the Cherokees. Holding that there was no "case" or "controversy," in which
only the constitution conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, and therefore the Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction, the court held that the Court of Claims
also received no jurisdiction from the legislation, and
hould have dismissed the petitions for want of jurisdiction, and not simply have dismissed the petitions."
The Philippine Code, a Spanish enactment, adopted
by the United States for the Philippines provided for certain offences, an imprisonment for from 12 to 20 years,
and directed that the convict should labor for the state,
should always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from
ihe wrists, should be under surveillance during life, and
the loss of many rights common to men. One convicted,
who appealed from the conviction, was released by the
Supreme Court," on the ground that the punishment was
cruel and unusual. The court said, through Justice McKenna, that it was not in its power to separate the
principal penalty, viz. the imprisonment, from the cruel
accessories, even if they were separable, "unless their
independence is such that we can say that their union
was not made imperative by the legislature * * *. This
certainly cannot be said of the Philippine Code as a Spanish enactment, and the order putting it into effect in the
islands did not attempt to destroy the unity of the provisions or the effect of that unity. In other words if
was put into force as it existed, with all its provisions

ixuskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346.

'Weems

v. United States, 217 U. S. 349.
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dependent.
2
ble." 1

We cannot therefore declare them separa-

'Justice White thinks that the various punishments 'Were separable. "The ruling now made must therefore rest upon the
proposition that because the law has 'provided an illegal inaddition to a legal punishment, it must be assumed that the legislature would not have defined and punished the crime to the legal
extent, because the same extent the legislature was mistaken
-as to its powers. ,But this I contend is to indulge in an assumption which is unwarranted and has 'been directly decided to the
contrary at this term in United States v. Union Supply Co., 215
U. S. 50."
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MOOT COURT
HANSON v. J NKS
Libel-Words Libelous per se-Special Damages-When Necemary
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These parties were undertakers in the same town of 10,000 inhabitants. In a certain family were two cases of typhoid fever,
both very serious, one of whom died. Three days before his death,
Jenks sent to the family a printed paper purporting to come
from Hanson, in which he was represented as saying: "We solicit
your patronage". This so incensed the family, -that on the ensuing death, it employed, as it would not otherwise have done,
Jenks. This is an action for damages.
La Rossa, for the plaintiff.
Goldsmith, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LEE, J. The plaintiff brings this action for ftsmages on the
ground that the publication is libelous. In the declaration of
Rights in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is written: C'tvery
citizen may freely speak, Trite or print on any subject, being responsible for abuse of that liberty." "The abuse of that liberty"
is what is called libel. A distinguished Chief Justice of Pennsylvania defined libel as "any malicious publication which tends to
expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred or degradftion of
character." Libel must contain words which are defamatory. The
different classes of defamatory worda are: (1) those actionable in
themselves. 'which naturally and necessarily inort damage to
another; (2) only libellous where they do special damage and are
supported by special1 proof of 'damage. The first class is sufficient for the present discussion. The question now arises as to
whether the publication was malicious and defamatory.
Was the motive of the defendant in sending the paper to advertise the business of the plaintiff? Was it with the idea that
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the people would place greater confidence in his ability than they
had heretofore, on account of kindly solicitations? We think not.
The publication represents him as i man devoid of sympathy;
one whose only thought of the dead was for pecuniary gain. magine a family gathered around the bedside of a loved one, heart'broken through fear of the possibility of being deprived of their
loved one, and anxiously awaiting the crsis, when a letter comes
from an undertaker saying: "We solicit your patronage." Would
a family employ a party who held himself out in this manner?
Hardly! The facts in this case state exactly what attitude they
would take. at would ruin the business of the plaintiff and blacken Nis character, and hence is actionable per se, as was held in
Dievil v. Shipman, 57 Minn. 23. It rwas there said that "any
publication calculated to expose one to public contempt, hatred or
ridicule is libelous per se." Would not such publication poison
the mind against the publisher? It is obvious that it would, the
publication is therefore defamatory. Courts have gone to great
lengths to protect the public ifrom the venom of a poisonous tongue.
The words may be entirely innocent in themselves, and which, to
the ordinary comprehension, do no mischief of any kind and under ordinary 0rcustances would do no injury; yet they may be
injurious and therefore libelous under certain circumstances.
Libel is an assault upon that which is so closely guarded,
namely, reputation. Libel takes away from a man, that which Is
the duty of the public to protect, his good name. With reputation
gone, a man's confidence in himself goes. Is it possible for a
merchant, or any business or professional man, in a community
of right living people, to make a success 'without a reputation?
A man's reputation is built up by the confidence imposed by others
in him and is jealously watched. In -thecase at bar, that intangible and invisible thing, established by years of toil, mu scattered to the avinds by the printdd solicitation.
Now considering the paper in regard to a trade libel, which
by the case of Price v. 'Conway, 134 Pa. 340, is ".any mritten or
printed words which are injurious to a person in his office,
piedession or calling or which impeach the credit of any merchant
or trader by imputing to him dishonesty, insolvency or even eam,barrassment are libelous." The quality of an alleged libel as it
stands upon the record, either simply, or as explained by averments and innuendoes, is a question of law for the couit, and in
civil cases the court is bound to instruct the jury as to whether
the publication is libelous, supposing the innuendoes to be ttue.
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Binder v. Daily View Publishing Co., 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 411.
The case of Hughes v. Samuels, 159 N. W. Rep. 589, is in
In that case the defendant was an undertaker, and acpoint.
cording to the allegations of the plaintiff, a rival in the same
business and town evolved the happy idea of getting prospective
customers "down" on the plaintiff and "higlh" on the defendant by
writing cards to prospects, whose wife or son or menber of the
family was hovering near death's door. These cards read: "Bear
in mind -our undertaking department. Satisfaction guaranteed."
To these cards, the defendant signed the plaintiff's name. The
Supreme Court of Iowa holds that a complaint setting up these
facts states a cause of action for libel.
By the Act of April 11, 1901, P. L. 74, 2 Purdon 2251,. section 3, it is provided: "In all civil actions for libel, no daniages
shall be recovered unless it is established to the satisfaction of the
jury, under the -direction of the court as in other cases, (1) that
the pubhcation has been maliciously or negligently made; (2)
appears,
such
but
where
malice
or
negligence
damage may be awarded as the jury shall deem proper." This
act is suppoated by the case of Commonwealth v. Pascoe, 39 Pa.
Superior Ct. 163.
"If a libel is so worded that it may naturally or probably be
taken to refer to the plaintiff, it is actionable by him though he
is not named or even called by a different name." Again: "Where
a libelous article refers to a person named, or it is so written
that it will reasonably be taken to refer to him, it establishes legal
malice within -the 3d section of the act of April 11, 1901, P. L.
74." "If the article is libelous per se and is false as to the plaintiff, malice is shown and -theburden of proof is on the defendant."
Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346. Oection 2, of the Act
of 1901, supra, gives the jury control over the whole subject of
damages, punitive as well as compensatory. "Written words the
manifest tendency of which is to seriously hurt another's reputation are actionable without proof of special damage, even though
-the comrission of no crime is imputed. IM[eck v. Johnson, 185 A
12; Collins v. Dispatch Publishing Co., 152 Pa. 187.
"Any publication, injurious to the social character of another
and not shown to be true, or -to have been justifiably made, is
actionable as a false and malicious libel." Collins v. Dispatch
Pub. Co., 1352 Pa. 187. Legal malice alone is sufficdent to support an antion, Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385.
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For the reasons herein stated we are of the opinion that the
plaintiff is entitled to damages.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
We are unable to discover that the defendant has committed
a libel, in the received sense of that word, and we are unwilling to
create a new definition for libel, that will make that tort embrace
the act of the defendant.
The printed matter, so fex as appears, was made, not by -the
iefendant, but the plaintiff.
Perhaps dozens and -hundreds of
specimens had been distributed by the latter. They were a business announcement not unlike announcements in newspapers or
sent by mail to paxticular -possible customers. There is not a
-false word in the paper, so far as we now, Nothing in it ,detracts
from the plaintiff's character.
What false thing, then, has the defendant done? He has
folded up the harmless paper, put it in an envelope, and using the
U. S. mail as -his agent, has sent it to a certain family. In this
family were cases of grave sickness. The defendant has virtually caused the family to think that Hanson sent the paper, knowing
of the likelihood of an early death in it. Thus thinking the tamily has conceived a dislike of Hanson, and possibly withheld from
him business which otherwise would have gone to dim Nothing,
reprehensible done by the defendant, is in writing. The censurable act is in the sending, at a certain time, with a certain intent,
of a certain paper. This sending, though reprehensible, is not
a libel. It was the misuse of a paper, prepared and issued,-so
far as appears-by the plaintiff.
We are aware that a respectable court, that of Iowa, has held
tLat the act is a libel. We are unable to agree with it, despite
the observations upon -it in the HTrvard Law Review, Jan. 1917,
p. 292, and in the Iowa Law Bulletin, Jan. 1917, p. 61. 'Hughex
v. Samuels Bros., 159 N. W. 589.
It does not follow -however that we must reverse the judgment
of the learned court below. Jenks has deceived the family in
which -were the sick, as to the sender of the paper which announced the readiness of the plaintiff to serve 'his patrons and he
has done this with a malicious purpose, that of creating a prejuaice against the plaintiff, and of depriving him of business that
be would otherwise have got. Th'is conduct was tortious; it has
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injured the plaintiff. It ought to be, and therefore is, actionable.
For any damages shown to have been suffered, and within the object of the defendant, he is responsible.
Judgment affirmed.

BRUMM v. STEVENS
Mines and Mining-Coal--Surface Support-Release of Damages
STAF=IEiNT O

FACrTS

Brumm owning land conveyed to Stevens all the coal lying
"under and within it," and released to him "every claim for damages to the surface, from the working of the mines in a proper
manner". Stevens took all the coal under -about twenty acreis
and put in no supports, the result being that the surface cfell in
at about twenty points, maling much of the land insusceptible
of use. This is trespass for the damages, found by the agreement
of the parties to be $500.
Goldman, Xor the plaintiff.
Campbell, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THlE (OURT
OISHB1SKY, J. 'While the common law right of the owner
of the soil to have the surface of his land supported by the underlying mineral estate conveyed to another party, has always been
recognized by our courts, it is equally true that the surtace owner
may and does waive this right by a grant of the coal together
with mining rights ankl the waiver of damages resulting from
the removal of the coal, or by words importing such a waiver."
Stilley v. Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 496.
The grantor, Baum, having, at the time of the execution of
the conveyance, released to Stevens "every claim for damages to
the surface, from the working of the mines in a proper manner,"
the only question that arises then is -the interpretation of the
words of -the release; that is, whether '*orking of the mines in
a proper manner" refers to the support of the surface. The
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manifest intention of the parties must, therefore, be gathered from
the language of the release and the nature of the transaction.
In Youghiogheny Co. v. Allegheny Bk., 211 Pa. 319, the court
construing the words "sloillful and careful mining" used in an
agreement, said that these words "relate to the manner of Working the coal, and do not impose upon the plaintiff company in
operating the coal the duty of leaving proper and sufficient sup.
ports for the surface."
The case of Kellert v. R. and P. Coal and Iron Co., 226 Pa.
27, is identical with the facts in the case at bar. The grantors of
coal under lanid, released all and every claim or claims for damages to the land caused "by operat~ing or working of said mines
in a proper manner." The court there says: "The manifest object of the stipulatfions and release in the deed of the grantors
was to secure to the grantee, that which had been purchased,
namely, all the coal in the land; providing it was taken out in
a proper manner. -So long as the surface is not disturbed, it is
immaterial to the owner whebher the coal is taken out in a proper
or improper manner. The grantors and grantee knew this, or
are presumed to have known it, and it must be assumed that they
made their contract with reference to the law applicable to such
transactions. The release of damages containd in the deed is
expressed in the broadest possible terms, and the only exception
made on account of damages to the surface by reason of the
removal of the coal is those damages wltich might be caused by
operating or working the mines in an improper manner. The
removal of all the coal is not an improper operating or working
of the mines."
It would be unreasonable to suppose that the parties had in
mind the removal of part of the coal, and leaving in of the reanainder for surface support. The phrase, all the coal, used in
the conveyance, to this court, means the whole, not merely a part.
The grantor, Brmnm, conveyed "all the coal" and no doubt intended to release all damages occasioned by the removal of it.
The release of damages related to the injuries resulting to the
land by the removal af the coal. This, we think, is in harmony
with Kellert v. R. and P. Coal and Iron 1Co., 226 Pa. 27; Stilley
v. uffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492; Miles v. N. Y., S. and W. Coal Co.,
250 Pa. 147. iBrumm, the grantor, under the law as stated, cannot recover and judgment must be entered for the defendant,
Stevens.
OPINiION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
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ROBINSON v. ECKELS
Party Wall-Wrongful Use-Estoppel-Injunction
STATMENT OF FACTS
The parties owned adjoining lots, Rdb'inson built along the
division line between these lots, but wholly on his own, a brick
wall four feet high. Three years later, Eckels desiring more piivacy decided to increase .the height of this wall to eight feet.
Without confer-ring with Robinson or in any way obtaining his
consent he began the construction. The erection of the addition
lasted through ten days; during which time Robinson, though
aware of the prosecution of the work, said nothing. On the completion of the building he filed this bill in equity to enjoin agalInst
the continuance of the wall. The trial Court held that by his delay in protesting, or filing a bill earlier, he was estopped.
Paul, for the plalintiff.
Puderbaugh, for the defendant.
OPINION OF TH E COURT
Blumberg, J. The principal question to be decided in the case
at bar is whether the appellant was estoppd by his conduct. To
create an estoppel the following elements must be present: (1)
There must have been a false representation or concealment of
material facts; (2) the representation must have been made with
knowledge of the facts; (3) the party to whom it was made must
have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; (4) it must have
been made with the intention that the other party should act
upon it; (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon
it. Rispham on Equity 437. Were these elements present? Let
us consider the first one. Was there a false representation? We
can see none. The appellant simply remained silent. There was
nothing done upon his part that induced the appellee to act. The
appellee acted without even consulting the appellant. lIt can
plainly be seen that none of the above elements are present.
The concealment of the truth often operates as an estoppel.
It has been forceably said that if a man is silent when it is his
duty to speak, he shall not be permitted to speak when it is his
Juty to be silent, but silence will not always work an estoppel, for
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silence may not always be inequitable. A person is not bound
under all circumstances to speak out; for example, he is not bound
to declare that which is a matter of record, and of which he has
a right to presume the other party has notice. In this case the
appellee could easily have ascertained whether the wall was on
his land or whether it was on appellants. All -he had to do was to
strvey the property. This was not a case where the conduct of
the appellant even enters. They both had equal means of ascertaining to 'whom the wall belonged, and if one acted without first
finding out he did so at his peril.
In Hepburn v. 'McDowell, 17 S. and R. 384, the court held:
"Notice is required to a man who acts bona fide, not to him who
willfully and obstinately persists in using that to which he has not
title, without giving or offering compensation for its use." To be
able to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the one setting
it up must be innocent of all laches and must have acted in good
faith. Nqational 'Cash Registr Co. v. Shearber. 41 Pa,., Super. Ct.
187. In the case at bar the appellee did not confer with Robinson or in any way obtain his consent. Is this a case of acting in
good faith? Is this relying on representation of the appellant?
In Bright v. Allen, 203 Pa. 394, a case similar to the one at
bar, it was said that "the doctrine of estoppel can arise only where
the conduct of a party has been such as to induce action by another; that the party setting up the estoppel, must have acted on
the faith of such conduct; that he must have been positively encouraged to act, or that he must have had a mistaken opinion respecting his title, and that the party to be estopped must have
been aware of this mistake, and if he had no such knowledge his
silence does not estop him.. If, therefore, the truth be known to
both 'parties, or if they have equal means of knowledge, there can
be no estoppel."
"Where a person goes upon the property of another, and
wrongfully and without claim of right builds upon a wall, he is
a trespasser, and he will be compelled by injunction to remove the
wrongful construction, and cannot allege that the owner is estpped because he has knowledge of the erection and made no protest" Bright v. Allen, Supra.
In the present case the defendant made no claim of right to
build upon. his portion of the wall unless it be held that such
claim was manifest by the act and operation of the building itself. If so, the plaintiff should have had notice of such claim
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prior to its exercise on part of defendant. He should not have
Proceeded without some color of title or some reasonable claim to
the right of use of the wall. No such right having been shown,
the only adequate remedy is to compel the removal of the wall.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and an injunction
is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREM'E COURT
The wall, the height of which .was increased by Eckels, the
defendant, w~s wholly on Robinson's, the plaintiff's, land. It was
not a party wall. Nothing had ever happened, which warranted
Eckels in assuming that he had the consent of Robinson to build
upon the wall. Haod he desired to know -whether Robinson consented, he could have learned by an easy inquiry. He had no
right to put on Robinson the necessity of objecting. He was
giossly careless, or indifferent to Robinson's rights. We think
the court below properly held that he could be required to take
down the structure which he had so arrogantly erected.
Affirmed.

ANDERSON v. HAMMOND
Umuctive Curative Statutes--Conveyance by Wife to HusbandAct of June 3, 1911, P. L. 631
STATEIMENT OF FACTS
'Mary Ashton in 1907 conveyed her land to Alexander Ashton, her husband. In the deed she was the sole grantor. The
purchase anoney, $6,000, was paid by him, and she immediately
distrbuted it among her three brothers. The grantee took possession and two years later conveyed the land to Hammond, who
has spent $20,000 in the erection of a building. In 1917 this ejectmeat was brought by William Anderson, one of the brothers of
Mary, as one of her three heirs.
-Hammond contends (1) that Anderson cannot recover; (2)
that if he recovers at all, he must recover on the condition that
he reimburse Hammond for the purchase money paid by Alexani r Ashton, and for the $20,000.
Williams, for the plaintiff.
Strite. for the defendant.

Dicki on Lm/w Review
OPINION OF THIE COURT
GORSON, J. The constitutionality of Sec. 2, of the act
of June 3, 1911, P. L. 631, is the only question involved.
The
answer to tis question will decide whether Ashton received a good
conveyance from his wife, and whether Hammond subsequently
received any title from Ashton.
There is no doubt that before the Act of June 3, 1911, a conveyance from a woman to her husband, she being the sole grantor,
was absolutely void. Such a deed would affect no change whatever in the title and would have the same value as a blank
piece of paper. The deed from Mary Ashton to her husbarid, at
the time it was executed, therefore, was void and conveyed nothing. Likewise the deed from the husband to Hammond two
years later 'was of no effect since the husband had no title to
convey.
But the act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 631, 6 Purdon 6589 provides:
"It shall be lawful for a married woman to make conveyances
of real estate to her husband as if she were a feme sole." Sec.
2, further provides: "All conveyances of real estate heretofore
made 'by any married woman to her husband, which have been
duly signed, acknowledged and delivered by her are hereby vaildat d and made good in law." It is on the second section of the
act that Hammonds title rests.
This is a retroactive curative
act and there seems to be some difficulty in determining from
the line of cases whether retroactive curative acts of this kind
are or are not in violation of the principles of the constitution.
The majority of the cases however seem to hold that these acts
are not of themselves unconstitutional. The circumstances of the
case must govern.
"We must take it for settled that the constitution is not vialated by an act of assembly unless the act would operate directly on some contract and literally impair it's obligation." Erie
and North East R. R. v. Casey. 26 Pa. 287. In referring to a
retroactive act, Chief Justice Tilghman, in Barnet v. Barnet, 1S
S. and R. 72, said: "It is the unanimous opinion that there is
nothing unconstitutional in this act of assembly, but it is also our
unanimous opinion that it does not extend, by retrospect, to render a ju dgment erroneous which ,was entered before it's passage."
In Jones' appeal, 57 Pa. 369, the question of the constitutionality of the act of April 11, 1-866 was involved. This was a
special act of assembly passed for a particular case to cure the
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defective title of land -held by John H. Jones. The supreme
court in reversing the lower court says: "The first observat:on to be made is, that this act is manifestly an enabling law
tr. carry out the express intent of Mrs. Attmore herself, and not
to Niolate her rights. It's purpose is to enable her, after receiving in good faith, the full price of her estate, to perform the
moral obligation resting upon her to secure the title to her vendee. If the act be unconstitutional, it must be because it has violated some right of the donor's to control the estate vested in
her through the instrumentality of the terms of their deed, or
has impaired the right of some other party, in the estate vested
in that party by these terms." In Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa. 320,
it is held that where retrospective acts impair no contract or disturb no vested right, but only vary remedies or cure defects in
proceedings otherwise fair, and which do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when
prosecuted may be supported. IMfr. White, qn his commentaries on
the constitution of Pennsylvania, (states the court in Luther v.
Luther, 22 Dist. 548) says: "Retrospective Laws which neither
destroy property nor impair contracts may be valid though never
favored, but they must not divest vested iights."
The court in Luther v. Luther, supra, after an elaborate reviewal of the law on the subject, decided that section 2 of the
act of 1911 will not be so construed as to divest rights vested
by such a conveyance when the act was passed. But the court
did not declare the act unconstituiional. The case of Howell v.
Wery, 40 Pa. C. C. 586, holds this section unconstitutional because the legislature (as the court tlinks) in effect makes a deed
and takes the property of one and- vests it in another, and that
this is in violation of the consibitution in that it deprives one of
his property -without due process of law. But Buchanan v. Corson, 51 Super. Ct. 588, which the counsel -forthe plaintiff cites as
authority for the unconstitutionality of this section, holds not
that this act is unconstitutional, but that it doesn't apply where
a married woman has prior to the enactment conveyed real estate
to her husband by a deed in which she is named as sole grantor,
and after her death one of the children has acqulired from the
others their undivided interest in the land so described. The
court also says that this act would contravene the federal constitution if construed to validate a deed from a huvband to a wife and
thus destroy an executed contract of conveyance from one child to
another.
In view of the foregoing opinions I believe the law may be
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stated as follows: Where a married woman has conveyed real
estate to her husband before the enactment of the act of 1911,
and no contract was made, or other right vested before the
But -where some right has
passage of the act, the act applies.
vested, the second section does not apply. This would necessarily depend upon whether the wife -was living at the time the act
was passed. If the wife was living, there could have been no
vested nights of contracts because these would be based on an,
expectancy and therefore nothing would pass. But if she died
previous to the enactment of the act, the heirs might have contracted between themselves and sold their interests as was done
in Buchanan v. Corson (supra) and this would defeat the statute.
There is no evidence in our case to show .whether or not the
wife was living at the tiime of the passage of this act, nor is there
any evidence of any contracts existing at that time, therefore we
must presume that there was nothing more than a conveyance
from the wife to the husband. The intent of Mary Ashton was
to make a conveyance to her husband and the act merely enabled
her to carry out her intent. There is also : moral obligation upon
her to complete the contract, for the purchase money has been
distributed among her three brothers and Hammond has spent
$20,000 on improvements. Judgment is therefore given for the
defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The able opinion of the learned court below makes protracted discussion of this case by us, unnecessary.
Without the act of June 3d, 1911, a conveyance by a wife,
even -when the husband joined in the execution of it, to her husLand, passed no title. Such was the deplorable state of our law,
as judge made. Alexander v. Shalala, 228 Pa. 297.
If the grantor only selected a go-between to receive the title,
it to the husband, the transacimmediately
convey
and
tion was respected. There is nothing wrong in a wife's causing
her land to become her husband's, even gratuitously; but she must
use two conveyances instead of one. She must find someone
%vho will act as receptacle of the ownership until he has time in
turn to convey it to the husband.
The act of 1911 has made unnecessary this childish circuit
ousness, thus performing one of the important functions of legislation.
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There are many decisions that recognize the soundness of
acts which give validity to deeds of married women previously
made, although they had not conformed to some former requirement. Deeds have been made valid, though not acknowledged as
the law required, 'because they carry out the intention of the
grantor.
It does not appear that Mary Ashton died before 1911. In
crider to maintain the constitutionality of the act of that year,
her being then alive will be assumed. But, if she had died before its passage, we cannot see how her heirs, who paid nothing
for the *$ivilege of inheritance, get anything more 'than she
had, viz, a defeasible right to avoid her deed, which could be
ended by the enactment of a validating statute. There are cases
that assume that -the heir gets more than his ancestor had, an indefeasible right, whereas he had only a defeasible one. We cannot follow these cases.
If we may assume that the three brothers of Mrs. Ashton
were aware of the source of the $6000 which she 'ivided among
them, they should -be held estopped to deny the title of Alexander Ashton, whose money they thus appropriated.
The judgment is affirmed.
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DONATION
VALUABLE DONATION TO LIBRARY
Mr. lCharles Nesbit Ulrich of the class of 1909, who lately
made a contribution of one thousand dollars to the fund for the
erection of the new building, has just ma&de another very liberal
gift zo the law school. It consists of complete sets of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure; of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 2d Ed.; of the American and English Annotated Cases, 40 volumes; -Corpus Juris to date and Ruling Case Law
to date. The current continuations of the sets still.being pub
lished he proposes to procure and deliver as issued.
Besides the aforementioned -works, Mr. Ulrich'9 gift embraces Kent's Commentaries, Taylor on Evidence, Shirley's Lending Cases on the Common Law, White and Tudor's Leading Cases
in Equity, Lewin on Trusts, Pollock on Torts, Wright and Carson's Criminal Conspiracies, ,Stephen's Malicious Prosecution, Pollock an 'Contracts, Lindley on Partnership, Smith's Master and
Servant, ShorW's Informations, Mandamus and Prohibition, Blackburn's Sales, Colyar's Guarantee, Porter on Insurance, Elphiin
stone on Interpretation of Deeds, Evans, Principal and Agent,
Cha'lis, Real Property, Brett's Leading Cases in Equity, May on
Fraudulent Conveyances.
These books have been placed in a separate section of the
library, which will be marked as containing the Charles N. UIrich donation. If the example of Mr. Ulrich should be emulated
by more of our alumni who have entered the Government service or by a bequest of their law libraries upon their death, they
could add greatly to the value of the school library, without serious hardship to themselves or their families.
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BOOK REVIEW
Cases on the Law of Private Corporations, by Daniel Frederick Burnett, Professor of Law in the New York University. Little, Brown and Co., Boston.
The value of case books has so far vindicated itself, that a considerable number of them may now be found on many subjects.
The book by Prof. Burnett is of one volume, containing over 800
pages, and from 175 to 200 cases. -Dispersed throughout 6t, are
many very valuable notes, which supplement conveniently the
principal reported cases. The classification of cases is both highly convenient and strictly scientific. The work is distributed
among six books, which deal respectively ,wth the subjects, the
nature of a corporation, the charter, the powers, the internal mechanism, the rights of cr~ditors and the dissolution and reorganization of a corporation. iBook H, on the charter, is subdivided
into its acquisition de jure, its acquisition de facto; the charter
as a contract between the stockholders; charter as a contract
between state and corporation.
The subject of corporations is a large one, and there are thousands of cases on it; but in the ordinary law school course, not
wore than 150 to 200 can be thoroughly studied. Nor is the study
of more needful for the man who is simply getting ready for adnlission to the bar. The selection of cases on this collection
strikes us as very judicious.
Many of the leading cases are
found in it. The book will prove to be admirably adapted to use
in corporation classes in schools.
It is needless to say that the mechanical execution of the book
d.s all that could be desired.

.4k

...

-

THE DECEASE OF JAMES W. WILLISON
Resolutions of the Dickinson School of Law
Whereas-God in His infinite wisdom has seen fit to remove
from our midst our esteemed fellow student, James W. Willison;
Whereas-Mr. Willison has, during the period of his enrollment as a member of this school, been heart and soul devoted to
the furtherance of the best interests of this institution;
Whereas-He has during the same period endeared himself in
the hearts of his fellow school-mates by his sterling qualities of
manhood, his congenial nature, and his ever ready willingness to
perform kindly service for each and all;
Be It Resolved-That we the Dickinson School of Law, do
tender to his bereaved parents and many aggrieved friends, our
sincerest sympathies:
Resolved Further-That a record of these resolutions be
spread upon the minutes of each class; a copy thereof transmitted
to his parents, and that they be published in the May issue of
the Dickinson Law Review.
Committee-1918: Harry W. Lee, Leo Lichtenstein; 1919:
William W. Jenkins, R. P. Campbell, Jacob Raub; 1920: Earl
V. McLaughlin, Donald B. Rockwell.

